Reopening the United States

Developed by TeamHealth Emerging Infectious Disease Task Force
Updated June 9, 2020
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The White House Framework</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Phases</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gating Criteria</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Countries Opening Up</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where is the United States Based on the White House Framework?</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symptoms</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Positive Tests</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States Reopening</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Flatten, Fight, Future Framework by Boston Consulting Group (BCG)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Case for Protect and Provide</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Problem(s) with Reporting Case Fatality Rate (CFR, ie. mortality)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect the Vulnerable Population</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The General Population</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Vulnerable Population</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containment</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reopening Your Emergency Department</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessibility</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff/Clinicians</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Due to the many unknowns related to the current COVID-19 pandemic, determining the right timing and approach to opening America again has proven to be quite challenging. Because of the lack of testing capacity and a continued lack of adequate knowledge regarding SARS-CoV2 infectivity, we do not have insight into the true population still at risk as we begin reopening. While most states have managed COVID-19 patient critical care surges during this initial wave, a handful were overwhelmed. Additionally, it is likely that our hospitals were able to handle the demand to some degree because it was blunted due to social distancing. Another potential factor is that the SARS-CoV2 virus likely has a lower overall case fatality rate than initially feared. The role that each of these factors had in the evolution of the pandemic and the future of the pandemic remains to be fully defined. Now that we are one month into the reopening of America, we have gained valuable insights and perspective on this continually evolving environment and we have updated this document to reflect recent data and insights.

THE WHITE HOUSE FRAMEWORK

THREE PHASES

The White House framework for reopening America involves three phases that are each gated by 14-day cycles of declining incidence and prevalence of disease and lack of evidence of recurrence. Each phase has guidance for individuals, employers and special employers along with progressive loosening of social distancing measures. There is acknowledgement that special considerations are necessary for vulnerable populations. They define vulnerable populations as: 1) elderly individuals and 2) individuals with serious underlying health conditions, including high blood pressure, chronic lung disease, diabetes, obesity, asthma, and those whose immune system is compromised such as by chemotherapy for cancer and other conditions requiring such therapy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>Shelter in Place</td>
<td>Shelter in Place</td>
<td>Resume public interactions with distancing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maximize physical distance</td>
<td>Maximize physical distance</td>
<td>Consider avoiding crowds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avoid groups of &gt;10 people</td>
<td>Avoid groups of &gt;50 people</td>
<td>Consider avoiding crowds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minimize non-essential travel</td>
<td>Non-essential travel can resume</td>
<td>No restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers</td>
<td>Encourage if possible</td>
<td>Encourage</td>
<td>Resume Unrestricted Staffing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minimize non-essential travel</td>
<td>Non-essential travel can resume</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special accommodations</td>
<td>Special accommodations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>Schools, Daycare, Camp</td>
<td>Reopen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers</td>
<td>Open with distancing and sanitation Closed</td>
<td>No visitors, strict worker hygiene Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seniors Living</td>
<td>physical distancing</td>
<td>Resume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large Venues</td>
<td>Can resume</td>
<td>Resume with limited physical distancing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elective Venues</td>
<td>Open with distancing and sanitation</td>
<td>Resume with sanitation protocols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gyms</td>
<td>Open with diminished standing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each phase is gated by a 14-day period of declining disease incidence and absence of re-emergence

Source: [https://www.whitehouse.gov/openingamerica/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/openingamerica/)

GATING CRITERIA

There are three gating criteria: 1) symptoms, 2) cases and 3) hospitals. The gating criteria for symptoms include: 1) downward trajectory of influenza-like illness (ILI) and 2) downward trajectory of COVID-like syndromic cases, both over a 14-day period. Similarly, the gating criteria for cases reflects a similar decrease over a 14-day period of: 1) documented COVID-19 cases and 2) positive tests as a percent of total tests. The hospital criteria include: 1) the ability to treat all patients without crisis care and 2) a robust testing program in place for all at-risk healthcare workers (HCW), including emerging antibody testing.
THREE COUNTRIES OPENING UP

As of April 23, several countries had announced or had already begun to move towards reopening. Several states in the United States have also announced plans to start gradual reopening.

CHINA

China ended its lockdown on April 5, two months after their peak number of daily new cases and six weeks after their peak number of active cases. China has continued to maintain low levels of cases two months after reopening.

Daily New Cases in China

Source: [https://www.whitehouse.gov/openingamerica/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/openingamerica/)
Active Cases in China

Active Cases
(Number of Infected People)

Source: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/china/ May 11

Active Cases in China

Active Cases
(Number of Infected People)

Source: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/china/ June 9
DENMARK

Denmark reopened schools the week of April 13, two weeks after their peak daily rate of new cases and two weeks after their peak in active cases. Despite reopening shortly after their peak in active cases, Denmark has seen a remarkable decline in active cases six weeks after reopening.

Daily New Cases in Denmark

Active Cases in Denmark

Source: [https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/denmark/](https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/denmark/) May 11
Austria began opening small business the week of April 13, one month after their peak in daily new cases and three weeks after their peak in active cases. Similar to Denmark, Austria has also seen a remarkable decline in active cases six weeks after reopening.

Austria

Austria began opening small business the week of April 13, one month after their peak in daily new cases and three weeks after their peak in active cases. Similar to Denmark, Austria has also seen a remarkable decline in active cases six weeks after reopening.

Daily New Cases in Austria

Source: [https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/denmark/](https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/denmark/) June 9
Active Cases in Austria

Source: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/austria/ May 11

Active Cases
(Number of Infected People)

Currently Infected

Reopening

Source: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/austria/ June 9
WHERE IS THE UNITED STATES BASED ON THE WHITE HOUSE FRAMEWORK?

SYMPTOMS

Although the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) data is lagging by two weeks, ILI and COVID-like symptoms are both trending lower weekly for the past nine weeks. ILI symptoms are now at levels below 2%, in line with levels seen in November 2019. Because influenza is not prevalent, this 2% can be seen as a proxy for COVID-19 prevalence.

Updated April 17, 2020

Likewise, daily numbers of new cases have been declining for eight weeks, since the peak on April 4 (data as of June 4). Note intermittent spikes in cases are likely related to surges in testing availability and weekend reporting as opposed to resurgence in COVID-19 cases.

Source: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/us/ May 8

Daily New Cases in the United States

Source: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/us/ June 9
Thus, both symptom criteria are already met nationally. It is important to acknowledge that these criteria likely vary based on state and even local geography, thus it is important to contextualize this data based on your local market.

Source: [https://www.whitehouse.gov/openingamerica/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/openingamerica/)

CASES

As of May 30, the current number of active cases is now declining in the United States for the first time since the onset of the pandemic. This decline comes four weeks after a peak in new daily cases.

Source: [https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/us/](https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/us/) May 8
When looking at IMHE data, which is continuously revised, we are still seeing five states which have not yet hit their peak in hospital demand: California, Utah, Arizona, Arkansas and Alaska. All of these states’ peak demands are expected to fall below their hospital capacity.
PERCENT POSITIVE TESTS

The CDC tracks percent positive COVID-19 tests. However, their data lags by one to two weeks at any given point in time. The most recent data published by the CDC shows percent positive COVID-19 tests declining over the past six weeks in all age groups. It is important to note that the CDC has received criticism lately regarding including antibody tests and tests on persons recovering from COVID-19 in the total number of tests, which would artificially lower the overall percent positivity.

This is in contrast to the COVID Tracking Project data, updated daily, which shows a decreasing rate of positive tests from a high of 25% to currently 5% over the past six weeks. Numbers of tests have exceeded 450,000 daily for the first time and are increasing on a daily basis. Many experts believe that we will need tens of millions of tests daily in order to be adequately prepared for the ongoing threat of COVID-19.

The decreasing percent positive tests is difficult to interpret in the context of the sharp increase in numbers of tests. This would suggest we are testing more asymptomatic patients which confounds our assessment of the prevalence of disease.
Thus, both cases criteria are met nationally. It is important to acknowledge that these criteria likely vary based on state and even local geography, thus it is important to contextualize this data based on your local market.

Source: https://www.whitehouse.gov/openingamerica/

STATES REOPENING

As of May 5, many states have taken steps towards reopening, despite not meeting the above outlined criteria. Georgia was one of the first states to announce reopening, though not yet arriving at its peak in active cases. While these early moves to reopen the economy are understandable, the actions must be weighed against the risk of resurgence of COVID-19 cases which would overwhelm the healthcare system. Many healthcare systems have improved their supplies of personal protective equipment (PPE), but the future need is uncertain, especially in the event of a second wave that exceeds the demands of wave one. There has been a dramatic increase in the number of states opening as of June 4. Currently, 41 out of 50 states are reopening, and eight are partially reopened. New Jersey, one of the hardest hit states, is understandably cautious in its plans to reopen and has not yet begun.

HOSPITALS

In order to understand hospital preparedness, we must understand both the capacity to effectively care for patients and the ability to protect hospital staff and patients through reliable PPE. The first category, “treat all patients without crisis care,” was largely accomplished through wave one of the pandemic. As previously mentioned, only New York, New Jersey and Connecticut saw hospital demand that exceeded bed capacity, according to the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME). If the success was, indeed, a result of social distancing, there is the potential that there is still large at-risk population susceptible to the disease and when social distancing is relaxed, we will see a resurgence in COVID-19 cases. This assertion is supported by the largest population-based study of SARS-COV-2 antibodies in the United States being administered in New York state. This study suggests, in aggregate 12.2% of the population has had COVID-19 disease but that the incidence varies regionally based on population density, correlating with urban, suburban and rural locations. Of note, in the global epicenter of the pandemic, New York City, the percent of people testing positive for antibodies is 20%, indicating that 80% of the population is still at risk, even in the hardest hit location in the country.

The second category, “Robust testing program...” has been insufficient to date, and there is no clear indication of when testing will be available to meet the needs of the country to identify and isolate COVID-19 cases. In a recent survey of TeamHealth Facility Medical Directors (FMDs), 55% indicated that they did not have sufficient testing capacity to identify COVID-19 patients. The lack of available testing, backlogs of available testing and the long turn-around times for test results created a situation during the initial epidemiologic curve where we were unable to effectively identify and isolate COVID-19 cases. As a result, the disease was able to spread much more pervasively. Newer antibody tests have the ability to detect acute or previous infection, providing valuable information as to the true incidence of disease and the potential of immunity in a 10-minute bedside test. These tests, however, have not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), even for emergency use, due to wide variations in sensitivity and specificity and lack of clarity of the significance of the presence of IgG as it relates to true short and long-term immunity. The ideal test is a bedside polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test able to detect the presence of the virus which should have the highest correlation to infectivity. While historically we have failed in the area of testing, there is promise in the near future that testing will not be a constraint to our combating the disease.

The following is a list of tests with FDA Emergency Use Authorizations (EUA) in development as of April 4, 2020. Note that four of these tests can be performed in under one hour.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% Positive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital District</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central NY</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finger Lakes</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hudson Valley</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Island</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohawk Valley</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Country</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYC</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Tier</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westchester/Rockland</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western NY</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Updated 5/2/20
The TeamHealth Emerging Infectious Disease Task Force has produced a wealth of information to help you better understand testing.

In addition, there is an externally updated list of all tests on the market, approved and not approved by the FDA, here.

In order to better assess hospital readiness, TeamHealth surveyed all of our facility medical directors (FMDs) across all service lines. More than 70% of our 760 medical directors responded to the survey from May 1 – 10. Some highlights of the results appear below.

**DISTRIBUTION OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ambulatory Care</th>
<th>Anesthesiology</th>
<th>Emergency Medicine</th>
<th>Hospital Medicine</th>
<th>Post-Acute Care</th>
<th>Specialty Care</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>63.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

64% of respondents reported having sufficient PPE throughout the first wave of the pandemic. 13% reported running out of N-95 respirators and 12% ran out of gowns. A smaller percentage ran out of eye protection (7%) and surgical masks (5%). Hospital-based specialties were more significantly impacted by N-95 respirators and gown shortages, while Post-Acute and Ambulatory, in general, were not supplied sufficiently to handle COVID-19 patients.

Our FMDs were told that, for the foreseeable future, all patients with ILI and CLI symptoms should be masked and all providers should wear a surgical mask for all patients and N-95 respirator for all aerosolizing procedures. It is reassuring that 90% felt that they could sustain PPE for this level of provision of care.

52% of respondents reported not having sufficient testing to meet the demand of their COVID-19 patients. When polled as to which patients should receive testing, a majority of medical directors in the inpatient and procedural-based specialties believed all patients should be tested, while emergency and outpatient directors were mixed either favoring a targeted approach to patients with ILI or CLI symptoms or patients requiring admission. When posed with a scenario of all patients presenting to the hospital for procedures or admission required testing, only 53% felt their hospital had the capacity to execute on this policy.

Source: https://www.whitehouse.gov/openingamerica/
According to BCG’s Flatten, Fight, Future framework, the COVID-19 pandemic will have three phases. The first phase is the “Flatten” phase, in which the primary risk is that the initial wave of disease overwhelms healthcare resources. The key in this phase is to flatten the curve through social distancing so that the healthcare system is able to expand resources and grow capacity. In addition to providing time for the healthcare system to prepare, it is argued to save lives by preventing oversaturation of the healthcare system which would result in increased morbidity and mortality. The “Flatten” phase is expected to last 7 to 14 weeks and will vary based on geography and state politics.

The end of the “Flatten” phase and the beginning of the “Fight” phase is signaled by a reduction in disease burden, which enables relaxing of social distancing. The “Fight” phase will require constant vigilance in terms of identifying new cases, broad-based testing and public health measures to isolate new cases to prevent a resurgence. As such, the “Fight” phase could encompass several “outbreaks” or clusters of disease that require reverting to some partial or complete social distancing measures. This could result in a number of new waves in a few different patterns. The first is a series of peaks and valleys of varying amplitudes and durations, the second is a fall peak that is more severe than the first wave (as a result of the large population of remaining susceptible individuals due to social distancing), and the slow burn, a result of progressive development of short term herd immunity which effectively limits the further spread of disease.

The “Fight” phase continues until there is such a significant population of immune individuals that the virus can no longer spread. There are three ways to achieve this “herd immunity”:

1. An effective vaccine is developed
2. An effective treatment is developed
3. Enough people acquire the disease and recover, developing antibodies

Most experts agree that the development and distribution of a vaccine is at least one year out. On April 21, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) released their consensus guidelines regarding effective therapies for COVID-19, concluding the following:
1. The COVID-19 Treatment Guidelines Panel (the Panel) does not recommend the use of any agents for pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) against severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) outside of the setting of a clinical trial (AIII).

2. The Panel does not recommend the use of any agents for post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) against SARS-CoV-2 infection outside of the setting of a clinical trial (AIII).

3. The Panel recommends no additional laboratory testing and no specific treatment for persons with suspected or confirmed asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection (AIII).

4. At present, no drug has been proven to be safe and effective for treating COVID-19. There is insufficient data to recommend either for or against the use of any antiviral or immunomodulatory therapy in patients with COVID-19 who have mild, moderate, severe or critical illness (AIII).

On May 1, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an *Emergency Use Authorization (EUA)* for remdesivir, an antiviral drug used for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) based on the Gilead trial that demonstrated a reduction in hospitalization from 15 to 11 days and a reduction in mortality from 12% to 8% that approached statistical significance. While this is not a “magic bullet” any intervention that will reduce duration of hospitalization and reduce mortality should be considered a significant step in the right direction.

The problem with developing natural immunity is that it is unclear how long immunity lasts against the coronavirus. Because SARS-CoV-2 is a new virus, this fact is not known. However, it is known that other coronaviruses do not impact lifelong immunity. Studies form the SARS outbreak in 2003 showed that 12% of individuals had no antibodies after one year and 50% had no antibodies after three years. HCW with mild to moderate MERS-CoV infection had no antiviral binding 18 months after recovery.\(^1\)

The “Fight” phase is expected to last between 12 to 24 months, and our success in this phase depends on multiple factors. Because each state controls the decision to reopen, there will be some variability in the timing of reopening. If a state reopens too soon, there is the risk that there will be a local recurrence of disease. The deployment of testing, surveillance and containment strategies will be important to prevent recurrence. The healthcare and public response infrastructure must be sufficient to support testing, tracing and isolation of positive cases.

The development and deployment of a vaccine is the most logical pathway out of this pandemic. Until this is achieved, coordination of monitoring and data sharing to achieve real-time course corrections will be crucial. Translating local successful interventions into scaled national programs will be important and can be facilitated though artificial intelligence. Tailoring the ultimate course for the high-risk and low-risk populations could accelerate the national recovery, shifting from “Flatten and Fight” to “Protect and Provide.” This would essentially translate into letting the disease run its course in the low-risk population and protecting and providing social resources to the high-risk population and to the healthcare system to support expansion of healthcare resources and ongoing preparedness.

**THE CASE FOR PROTECT AND PROVIDE**

A key requirement of “Protect and Provide” strategy is the clear delineation of high-risk and low-risk populations. Fortunately, since the beginning of the pandemic in China, data has consistently shown very low risk in younger individuals. It has also shown to adversely affect elderly individuals and those with preexisting medical conditions, including high blood pressure, chronic lung disease, diabetes, obesity, asthma, and those whose immune system is compromised such as by chemotherapy for cancer and other conditions requiring such therapy.

While tracking patients with comorbidities may be complicated, analyzing data on age and mortality related to COVID-19 is relatively easy, and the data is quite abundant. However, there are inconsistencies in data being reported from common tracking sites, like Worldometers and IHME. This is presumably due to the greater accuracy required by the CDC in terms of processing death certificates or a backlog due to human resource or other limitations. As such, the CDC data typically lags 7 to 14 days on any given reported measure. CDC data as of April 23 shows the following age and case fatality rate (CFR) distribution:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>COVID-19 Deaths</th>
<th>COVID POS Tests</th>
<th>Reported Case Fatality Rate (CFR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total 0-24</td>
<td>103,856,244</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10,868</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 24-44</td>
<td>86,975,662</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>207,833</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 45-64</td>
<td>83,904,335</td>
<td>3,691</td>
<td>212,099</td>
<td>1.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-74 years</td>
<td>30,492,316</td>
<td>3,829</td>
<td>61,917</td>
<td>6.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 and over</td>
<td>21,938,877</td>
<td>9,689</td>
<td>69,429</td>
<td>13.96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE PROBLEM(S) WITH REPORTING CASE FATALITY RATE (CFR, i.e. MORTALITY)

It is difficult to interpret CFR data coming from the CDC and other data sources. This is because there are so many confounding variables that could increase or decrease the perceived CFR of COVID-19.

1. Because we are only taking a snapshot in time, we could underestimate the CFR because although many cases are diagnosed, a small fraction have recovered. Also, the duration of illness is long enough that we do not yet know the outcome of a majority of the cases. For example, as of April 26, there are 987,160 cases and 55,413 deaths in the United States. If you only considered these two numbers, you would incorrectly assume a mortality rate of 5.6%. The reason for this is that only 118,871 cases have recovered and 868,289 are still in the active phase of illness. Likewise, if we take the 55,413 deaths and divide this by the total recovered or deceased (total completed cases is 174,284), you would incorrectly conclude the CFR is 3.2%.

2. The overall mortality rate of the general population may also be higher than can be explained by COVID-19 deaths alone. Some COVID-19 deaths could be underreported due to lack of testing for coronavirus particularly early in the pandemic. Some people may die at home of COVID-19 remaining undiagnosed. Other people may die from other illnesses like stroke or heart attacks due to a fear of going to the emergency department (ED) and being exposed to COVID-19 or from the emotional stress impacts of the pandemic on their chronic illnesses.

3. If we are only testing patients with moderate to severe illness because we have not had widespread testing available, there would presumably be more cases in the population that are uncounted, effectively increasing the CFR because there are fewer total cases counted (the denominator).

4. By antibody testing a random cross section of the population and looking for IgG, we can better understand the true incidence of disease. Because IgG is indicative of prior disease and recovery, it would tell us how many people have been infected since the onset of the pandemic. We would likely find more cases, increasing the denominator and effectively lowering the CFR.

Although it is difficult to arrive at an exact mortality figure, one important conclusion we could draw from the raw CDC data is that the relative risk of the above age 65 population relative to the under age 45 population is 9.44% / 0.21% or 45. In other words, if two people were to contract the COVID-19 disease, one over 65 years and the other under 45 years, the over-65 person would have a 45-fold higher risk of dying.

Perhaps the most important issue with the reported data is the lack of testing and thus the failure to report the total number of positive tests out of 2,300 prisoners tested. Of those testing positive, percent of asymptomatic COVID-19 patients may be as high as 25%. In March, Iceland tested more than 10,000 people and found that 50% were asymptomatic. A recent study of Marion Correctional Institution in north central Ohio found 2,028 positive tests out of 2,300 prisoners tested. Of those testing positive, close to 95% were asymptomatic. While the absolute number and percent of positive asymptomatic patients is unclear, counties and states have begun to attempt to answer that question.

There have been three local studies to date characterizing the presence of antibodies as a surrogate for incidence of disease and others underway in Michigan and by organizations such as the CDC and NIH.

1. Santa Clara County – 50 out of 3,330 volunteers tested positive (1.5%). After correcting for false positives, they estimated antibodies between 2.5 to 4% of the population with potentially 48,000 to 81,000 cases in a county with the population of 1.9 million. That county had reported only 1,946 positive test results. This indicates an estimated true incidence of 32 times the testing positivity rate.

2. Los Angeles – Out of 863 adults tested, 4.1% had antibodies to the virus, suggesting a 2.8% to 5.6% incidence of infection. This translates into 221,000 to 442,000 out of the 10 million people had been exposed vs. 8,000 recorded. This indicates an estimated true incidence of 41 times the testing positivity rate.

3. New York State – New York began a statewide antibody study on April 20 and has collected around 15,000 samples from 40 locations in 19 counties across the state through May 1. In New York City, about 20% of randomly sampled people had antibodies against the coronavirus. The incidence across the state was 12.2%. If the actual infection rate among the entire population is similar to the early sample infection rate they found of 12.2%, it would change the death rate of the state. New York is reporting 19,645 COVID-19 deaths, and if 2.4 million people were infected, that would mean the case fatality rate would be 0.8%. As of May 4, New York had 321,192 reported positive cases. This indicates an estimated true incidence of 13.1 times the testing positivity rate.

While it is challenging to calculate the true CFR from this extrapolated data, we can conclude that the true CFR is likely lower than reflected in the reported data. Because New York has the most conservative picture in terms of incidence in the population relative to positive tests and because they have excellent public health data, their data may be helpful to determine at-risk populations. The following is the distribution of deaths based on age range in New York City:
This data demonstrates that 73.5% of the mortality is represented in the over 65 population. The New York City data is consistent with national CDC data, which reports this percent as 76.3%:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Underlying Conditions</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Absent</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total Deaths</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-44</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>4.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>2,225</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>2,649</td>
<td>22.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-74</td>
<td>2,065</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>2,910</td>
<td>24.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;75</td>
<td>3,819</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,952</td>
<td>5,772</td>
<td>48.84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data shows that 76% of the total deaths related to COVID-19 are coming from 16% of the total population. Regardless of where the numbers ultimately fall, the most significant point is that patients over the age of 65 are 45 times more likely to die of the disease than patients under 45 years of age. Thus, instead of locking down the entire country, we should focus our efforts on the over age 65 population to “Protect and Provide,” opening the economy and providing the resources to support the healthcare system to treat those with the disease and remain vigilant in case of a recurrent widespread outbreak.

**PROTECT THE VULNERABLE POPULATION**

In the context of lack of treatment or vaccine, the only alternatives are containment and social distancing (source control). This is best achieved, as outlined above, through defining, protecting and providing for vulnerable populations, development of broad-based testing capabilities and implementation of a coordinated surveillance and monitoring program.

**THE GENERAL POPULATION**

Based on the “Protect and Provide” framework, the under 65 population should return to work as soon as feasible (i.e. phase 1) with practical considerations to social distancing in the workplace and commercial areas. The main consideration in this population should be prompt addressing of symptomatic individuals and protection of vulnerable coworkers. Examples would include:

1. Self-screening and isolation if symptomatic – workers should screen for symptoms and fever temperature prior to reporting for work. If symptoms arise at work, patients should be sent home. All symptomatic individuals should be tested for COVID-19.
2. All employees should exercise strict hand hygiene.
3. To the degree possible, relationships should be established with known testing providers in order to establish reliable reporting and follow-up mechanisms.
4. Vulnerable should wear masks when not at their workstation, in group meetings and common places until there are no active cases of COVID-19 in the local community or region.
5. For future surges in COVID-19, vulnerable people should return to social distancing immediately upon the detection of a rise of cases in the local community. For the non-vulnerable population, strict social distancing should be implemented only when it is projected that healthcare and intensive care unit (ICU) resources will be overwhelmed in a given locale.
Vulnerable populations are defined as: 1) elderly individuals and 2) individuals with serious underlying health conditions, including high blood pressure, chronic lung disease, diabetes, obesity, asthma, and those whose immune system is compromised such as by chemotherapy for cancer and other conditions requiring such therapy. This population should maintain social distancing until phase three as outlined by the White House, and they should immediately return to social distancing with any return of COVID-19 to the community. This includes:

1. Maintain social distancing with the exception of essential activities (i.e. grocery shopping).
2. Vulnerable should wear masks when in public and exercise strict hand hygiene.
3. No visitors should be allowed to nursing homes and assisted living facilities. All workers in these facilities should be screened for symptoms and fever prior to coming to work, and any symptomatic workers should be tested immediately. If a worker is found to be positive, all workers and residents should be tested.
4. Vulnerable individuals should limit group activities.
5. There should be liberal routine screening testing of the asymptomatic in group settings and symptomatic others.
6. Vulnerable populations should limit contact with the under age 65 population. Vulnerable should wear masks and exercise strict hand hygiene when interaction is necessary.
7. Government should support the elderly through financial aid, social support and healthcare systems to expand capacity.

CONTAINMENT

Containment requires very low disease prevalence and high resources for tracing purposes (people and tests). The resources required for tracing and monitoring quarantined individuals has overwhelmed the local and state health departments who are not resourced for large spikes in activity. During surges in activity, the government should work with the private sector to execute in collaboration with local health departments and the CDC. This can be accomplished through local healthcare systems, telehealth and advanced surveillance methods like cell phone tracing. In order for containment to be effective, we must be able to support widespread testing with real-time results, and we must be able to support the healthcare system to care for patients and prevent further spread of disease.

A broad-based testing strategy must be available in anticipation of recurrent cluster outbreaks and implementation of isolation measures for infected individuals.

1. Tests should be available in all healthcare delivery locations, including pharmacies and first responders. This includes EDs, hospital points of entry for admittance or outpatient procedures, urgent care centers, pharmacies, emergency medical service (EMS) locations, nursing homes and assisted living facilities.
2. All HCW should be screened daily for ILI symptoms and fever upon presentation to workplace. Any symptomatic individuals should be immediately tested.
3. All post-acute residents should be screened daily for symptoms. Any symptomatic individuals should be immediately tested. Routine surveillance testing should be performed to screen for asymptomatic outbreaks.
4. All patients entering the hospital for admission or outpatient procedures should be tested with the possible exception of lab and radiology in lieu of expanded precautions (i.e. mask patient, mask technician and forced hand hygiene).
5. Symptomatic ED patients should be tested, and HCW should mask symptomatic patients and wear masks and eye protection in all encounters with symptomatic individuals. All patients admitted from the ED should have any initial bedside screening test followed by confirmatory PCR test.
6. All HCW should be tested initially, and routine screening programs should be implemented to screen for asymptomatic individuals. This program should be implemented in all hospitals, nursing homes, assisted living facilities, urgent care facilities and outpatient surgery centers.
7. Frequency of surveillance testing needed is unclear and should be based on prevalence of the disease at any given point of time in the local community.

The model above was proposed to TeamHealth’s FMDs, who were asked if their organization had the testing capacity to carry out the protocol described above, and 52% indicated that they did not have the capacity today. Of those who did have the capacity, only 44% indicated they could sustain that level of testing for over a month.

The following is a model proposed by the Duke Center for Public Health that includes test and treat infrastructure, syndromic surveillance, serologic testing and rapid response in order to achieve long-terms sustained containment:

1. Test and Trace Infrastructure: Capacity for Widespread Diagnostic Testing and Data Sharing to Enable Rapid Case-Based Interventions
a. The capacity to conduct rapid diagnostic testing for everyone with COVID-19 symptoms and those with exposures or at higher risk of contracting or transmitting the virus (HCW, those in congregate settings), with a robust sentinel surveillance system that routinely monitors for infection among samples of the population to enable early identification of small outbreaks, particularly in vulnerable populations;

b. Routine, straightforward and secure electronic data sharing to support surveillance;

2. Syndromic Surveillance: Integration of Test and Trace into an Enhanced National Syndromic Surveillance System

   a. Surveillance based on syndromic indicators of spikes and falls in potential COVID-19 related symptoms, building on existing public health syndromic surveillance capabilities

   b. Timely and transparent reporting of COVID-19 outbreaks and testing and response capacity at the local level

3. Serologic Testing: Capacity to Conduct Widespread Serologic Testing to Identify Reliable Markers of Immunity

   a. The development of regional measures of community exposure and immunity

   b. The use and integration of accurate serologic testing of individuals for effective surveillance and containment

4. Rapid Response: Capacity for Isolation, Contact Tracing and Quarantine

   a. The capacity to isolate new cases and trace, test and quarantine contacts rapidly

   b. The capacity to treat new COVID-19 cases effectively, at home or in a hospital

In order to support the healthcare system to care for patients and prevent further spread of disease, healthcare systems must be provided support in the form of PPE, serologic and PCR testing, equipment and human resources. It is important to emphasize that the healthcare system should be supported to maintain a constant state of readiness in terms of capacity for cluster outbreaks as opposed to capacity for the bare minimum or average anticipated outbreak until there is no longer a clear and present danger. The most relevant risk to healthcare can be defined in terms of exposure to HCW and saturation of inpatient, ICU, ventilator and human resources. The most significant risk to patients is when inpatient and ICU resources fail to meet the demand of patients presenting for care. In these situations, mortality increases significantly over baseline.

RESOURCES

PPE must be readily available to all HCW. This includes sufficient standard precautions must be stocked with a reliable supply chain. The following are PPE recommendations until COVID-19 is no longer a clear and present threat as indicated by the development of a vaccine or viable treatment or the absence of COVID-19 in the local community as measured by the CDC and local or state health departments.

1. Proper hand hygiene is top priority as is liberal use of alcohol-based hand sanitizer.

2. All ILI and CLI patients and family members entering any aspect of the facility should be masked.

3. HCW caring for ILI and CLI patients should wear surgical masks and eye protection

4. Expanded precautions, including gowns, gloves, N-95 masks and face shields, should be used on any patients undergoing aerosolizing procedure such as endotracheal intubation or bronchoscopy.

5. For service lines in the hospital providing procedures, such as endoscopy, cardiac catheterization, surgical services and anesthesia, a documented negative COVID-19 test should be in place for all elective procedures. This can be accomplished with a rapid, bedside PCR test in under one hour as a part of routine pre-admission testing.

6. All positive COVID-19 patients and untested emergent or urgent patients should be treated as if COVID-19 positive with expanded PPE.

Patients with ILI and CLI symptoms should be considered positive until definitively proven otherwise. As previously indicated, rapid testing should be immediately performed on all suspected patients. Ideally this is a bedside PCR test. The value of serology tests is unclear at this time, but due to the false negative rate of up to 70% and the fact that they will not turn positive until seven days after infection, these tests are not sensitive enough to reliably prevent infection in healthcare facilities. If a bedside serology test is the only available rapid test, PCR testing should be used to confirm the results prior to determining the patient is negative for COVID-19 disease. Highly suspicious cases (i.e. x-ray, CT or lab findings) should use high level protection regardless of test result.

In our study of TeamHealth FMDs, 22.1% ran out of some element of PPE. 12.4% ran out of N-95 respirators, 6.9% ran out of surgical masks, 15.2% ran out of gowns and 9.2% ran out of eye protection. Only 77.9% of FMDs reported not running out of one or more elements of PPE. The supply chain failed for a number of reasons: 1) China was hit first, wiping out 80% of the global production, 2) health systems, states and even the federal government were competing with each other, often through bidding wars, and 3) PPE was sourced internationally through an impaired air transport system and overwhelmed customs process. Moving forward, the PPE supply chain should be maintained through public/private partnership with the government supporting increased reserve quantities within the supply chain to prevent obsolescence. In order to maintain the most reliable supply chain and mitigate against the impact of another global pandemic, investments should be made in PPE sourced in the United States to prevent supply chain issues.
ICU and ventilator resources have proven to be the most important elements of pandemic preparedness through the “Flatten” phase of the pandemic. The severe nature of the sickest patients and the prolonged ventilator support and inpatient care required drive the potential saturation of healthcare resources. As previously mentioned, only New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut experienced demand surges in excess of their capacity. This may be different in local markets that have experienced cluster outbreaks. However, it does appear that the planning required to address this first wave of COVID-19 has identified areas for expansion of ICU capacity and quantified the need for ventilators. Local facilities should hardwire this expansion into their disaster preparedness response. Thus, vigilance and monitoring of healthcare capacity will always play an important role until a vaccine or treatment has been developed. The government should support healthcare systems to bridge the gap between ventilator supply and calculated need. There has been some innovation related to cost-effective alternatives to existing ventilators. The government should support production of low-cost ventilators and supply them to hospitals to circulate into their existing ventilator pool for maintenance purposes. It should be noted, however, that the ultimate impact of social distancing on demand for healthcare resources remains unclear. If it did significantly flatten the demand for healthcare resources, there is an almost certainty that the remaining population of people who have not been exceeds the population that have been exposed and have recovered.

Human resources have also been challenged during the first wave of the pandemic. However, due to reduced operating room volumes, anesthesiologists, general surgeons and surgical specialists were effectively able to support ICU, inpatient and ED care. During social distancing, ED volumes showed declines of up to 50% while declines in surgical and ED volumes temporarily reduced the inpatient demand for hospitalists by up to 20%. This inpatient demand returned during peak COVID-19 periods, in some cases exceeding pre-COVID-19 demand. Thus, shifting of resources was shown to effectively compensate for the dramatic rise in demand during COVID-19 peaks. Instead of augmenting human resources, support should be provided to cross train and provide the mechanism for reimbursement when caregivers provide care in other areas of the healthcare system, some of which is either not currently reimbursable or is not reimbursable at a lower rate due to type of procedure, demand for procedures or achievable efficiency.

**REOPENING YOUR EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT**

We have experienced unprecedented times as we have navigated COVID-19. Listed below is a checklist of key operational considerations for Emergency Department (ED) leaders to evaluate and proactively prepare and plan in operationalizing emergency departments

**CHAOS** (Communication, Hospital, Accessibility, Operations, Staff/Providers)

**COMMUNICATION**

1. Communicate with all of your patients in the community
   - Identify ways to proactively communicate such as posting in department, hospital website, social media, newspaper, radio, home mailers and/or town halls
   - Consider updating automated recordings/phone trees on hospital phone numbers or information lines to include a message that it is safe to come to the emergency department (ED)
   - Key points to consider include:
     - Process changes, such as screening at the door, online/kiosk check-in and new policies for caregivers in the ED
     - How the ED is supporting social distancing and other steps the ED is taking to protect the health of patients and staff, such as elevated cleaning protocols
     - Considerations for higher-risk and/or respiratory patients on arrival
     - New telemedicine options and how to make the most of a telemedicine visit
   - Create/update frequently asked questions and patient facing material including:
     - Steps patients can take to avoid COVID-19
     - Steps patients should take if they (or a member of their household) are experiencing symptoms that might be COVID-19

2. Communicate with hospital and community partners that interact with you
   - Identify ways to proactively communicate with entities such as EMS/fire, police, private practices, etc. via social medial, email, newsletter, etc.
   - Key topics to think through and incorporate:
     - Marketing plan for referrals and patient loyalty as needed
     - Overview of any ED flow changes including screening at the door, online materials for checking in and/or telemedicine
• Overview of how ED is supporting social distancing and other steps the ED/hospital is taking to protect the health of patients, staff and providers
• Considerations for higher-risk patients, including alternate flow

3. Communicate with staff/providers during recovery
• Establish a process to address staff concerns about exposure to COVID-19
• Prepare to support staff processing their role in responding to COVID-19, including testing/screening, shifting their site of care, providing care to COVID-19 patients, and losing patients to COVID-19
• Proactively communicate changes to HR policies related to time off, absenteeism, flex scheduling, etc. post-COVID and establish a channel for questions and feedback
• Promote transparency and regularity in communicating changes or updates with staff

HOSPITAL
4. Hospital sequencing of available clinical services versus opening all services at once
• Review current city, state, and national rules or guidance on the types of services that can be offered to patients
• Evaluate current hospital and emergency department (ED) staff availability and resources to determine if the full complement of hospital clinical services will be resumed or will be phased
• Incorporate guidance from hospital and TeamHealth executive leaders to ensure that the ED plan is aligned with any larger hospital plan

ACCESSIBILITY
5. New screening protocol at entry to the ED (including COVID-19 testing)
• Establish new protocols for patient arrival including, but not limited to:
  • Signs outside the department/on the door if patients are experiencing symptoms
  • Taking patients' temperature at the door/upon arrival
  • Screening questions
  • Respiratory vs non-respiratory patient flow to ensure separation
• Identify standard protocols for symptomatic patients so staff are consistent in criteria and communication
• Communicate with patients on arrival any new screening protocols
  • Outlining plans for sharing responsibility for roles/responsibilities with higher risk to exposure
  • Outlining COVID-19 testing plan if ED/hospital have access to tests

OPERATIONS
6. Adequacy of PPE supply and equipment
• Audit current PPE supplies, including N95 masks, surgical masks, gloves, hand sanitizer and disinfecting wipes
• Review ED operations to ensure appropriate use, identifying opportunities to conserve supplies
• Confirm your ability to order new supplies and anticipated delivery timelines
• Create back-up plans for sourcing supplies
• Create back-up plans for prioritizing ED clinical services if supplies become limited, including how you will communicate to patients and staff if supply shortages force changes to operations

7. Waiting room social distancing compliance
• Evaluate waiting room to ensure six feet between patients considering the following options
  • Rooming patients directly
  • Having patients wait in their car in the parking lot
  • Creating alternative waiting spaces with larger square footage
  • Establishing dedicated space for high-risk patients
  • Consider portable transparent dividers between waiting spaces such as Plexiglas dividers
• Review process for rooming patients and moving patients around the ED to maintain social distancing with other patients
• Audit places where patients congregate – check in, check out, results waiting, lobby, vending areas – to ensure social distancing and limit shared resources (i.e. pens, clip boards, electronic devices)
• Create patient-facing material to share/post in ED/lobby/hospital website about changes in operations, including any steps patients can take on arrival (such as answering screening questions, applying a mask, using hand sanitizer)

8. Throughput times and process re-evaluation
• Review current throughput/ED flow process and flow model to identify delays to care impacted by COVID-19 process flow changes and develop improvement solutions
• Consider whether telemedicine will be a service that may be appropriate for select patient population
• Review metric goals with executive leaders that had been established pre-COVID-19 and evaluate factors that may impact these goals
• Consider innovations/tools to assist with scheduling patients in the ED such as INQuicker

9. Telemedicine services
• Outline new strategic plan for telemedicine services including clear guidance around telemedicine services
• Create a prioritized plan for rolling out new telemedicine services
• Evaluate forums or other feedback loops for quickly sharing telemedicine best practices within the ED, as well as lessons learned

10. Preparing/planning for a second wave
• Plan for how the ED would respond to a second wave of COVID-19/ILI/pandemic to include a process for adjusting staffing and prioritizing and modifying services
  • Review lessons learned from the first wave to identify what the ED would want to do again, and what the ED would want to do differently, in a second wave
  • Discuss and identify a recovery plan to be applied after the second wave
  • Discuss possible surveillance criteria that could help identify early indicators in order to plan and determine when ED operations would need to be shifted
  • Identify what metrics would be early indicators to begin round two of ED recovery
  • Identify triggers to deploy and deactivate surge or disaster processes

11. Patient experience strategies and tactics
• Additional efforts and standardized scripts that staff need to apply to foster a positive patient experience in spite of the PPE and other barriers caused by the need for social distancing
• Implement messaging with patients to reinforce actions that ensure their safety and gain trust
• Post and communicate time expectations regarding unexpected delays & length of stay

12. Review and revise 2020 budget against new volume and revenue projections
• Review possible cost saving measures now, and plan a phased approach for when to deploy/implement those measures
• Review Cognition to ensure staffing is aligned with new demand
• Develop Left Without Being Seen (LWOBS) mitigation plan
• Consider volume growth strategies and tactics

STAFF/CLINICIANS

13. Guideline for testing for patients, staff and providers
• Ensure that hospital guidelines are updated related to testing and work plans for staff
• Prepare a plan for what the ED would do if a patient tested positive for COVID-19 after a visit to the ED including communication with staff and patients, and any additional cleaning needs
• Consider waive testing if available

14. New training and competencies to address with staff/clinicians
• Consider any age specific education, supplies and/or equipment needs such as with Multisystem Inflammatory Syndrome (MIS-C) and pediatrics
• Consider any new equipment and/or procedures that require additional and/or specialized training

RESOURCES
• TeamHealth white paper, Reopening America
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
SUMMARY

The COVID-19 pandemic has been an unprecedented global challenge. As we pass through the first wave of the pandemic, most experts agree there will be future waves of disease until we find a suitable treatment or vaccine. Due to the severe impact of this pandemic on the healthcare system, social distancing measures were implemented in order to flatten the curve, providing time needed to prepare the healthcare system by expanding intensive care resources and attaining sustainable levels of PPE. As we pass through the “Flatten” phase, we enter a period where we need to maintain vigilance and caution, protecting and providing for the most vulnerable and allowing the least vulnerable to reopen the nation. This will require widespread testing availability, surveillance systems, public health resources, and most importantly, engagement of all Americans.

REFERENCES
